Exhibit C

Affidavit of Ahmed Mabrouk
DECLARATION OF AHMED MABROUK

I, Ahmed Mabrouk, declare as follows:

1. I am a former employee of KGL Investment Company K.S.C.C ("KGLI"). I worked for KGLI for approximately 18 months during the 2008-09 period. I was hired by and reported directly to Wael Salam, who at the time was the Chief Investment Officer for KGLI. My title at KGLI was Vice President Investments, and my responsibilities included reviewing and analyzing KGLI's investment portfolio. While I was employed at KGLI, my office was directly around the corner from the office of Maria ("Marsha") Lazareva, the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of KGLI.

2. KGLI's headquarters were located in the same building and on the same hallway as the headquarters of KGL Holding K.S.C ("KGL Holding"); and in the same building as Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Company ("KGL"), and KGL Transportation Company KSCC ("KGL Transportation Company"). I sat on the same hallway as Saeed Dashti, the Chairman and Managing Director of KGL, and Ali Dashti, the Chairman of KGL Holding. Other key executives of KGL Holding, KGL, and KGL Transportation Company, as well as the lawyers for these entities, also had offices in the same headquarters as KGLI. Additional executives of KGL Holding headquartered at KGLI included Sam Halabi, Director of Business Development.
and Yousef Dashti, also a business development executive. In addition, during KGLI’s capital fundraising efforts, I observed that there was a substantial overlap in investors between KGLI and KGL Logistics.

3. I am aware that Saeed Dashti invested substantial sums of money in KGLI at its inception, and as such, was a key founder and minority, controlling shareholder, personally and through companies controlled by him and Ali Dashti. While I was employed at KGLI, I observed that Saeed Dashti was very involved in fundraising for KGLI, and its various investment portfolio companies and funds; he also controlled KGLI and these various investment portfolio companies and funds very closely, either personally or through close relationships with various individuals, including key management executives. Saeed Dashti served as the chairman of certain of KGLI’s investments, including its investment in Unified Transport and Logistics Company ("UNIF") in Amman, Jordan. I attended UNIF Board of Directors meetings and observed Saeed Dashti acting as Chairman. I also have reviewed minutes of the Board of Directors of UNIF, which list Saeed Dashti as Chairman.

4. While working for KGLI, I observed the investments that KGLI was making. From these observations, and from my review of the financial records of the company, I observed that many of KGLI’s investments, from the outset, did not fit KGLI’s original strategic goals, as had been stated to its investors and in fact, did not actually generate positive returns or exits, including return on equity, dividends, or cash outflows for investors.

5. For example, I observed that Saeed Dashti brought the UNIF investment to KGLI, and forced KGLI’s investment in UNIF. Based on my review of KGLI’s and UNIF’s financial records, as well as my general knowledge of UNIF’s business, which I learned from, among other things, attending UNIF Board of Directors meetings and reviewing Board meeting...
minutes, I concluded that KGLI's investment in UNIF was not sound. UNIF was a Jordanian transport entity that had rights through Syria and Iraq and was nearly bankrupt when KGLI made its investment. I understood that these rights allowed transportation of goods between Jordan and Iran. It did not make economic sense for KGLI, an investment company, to own such an unprofitable transportation entity; and this investment, in fact, did not generate profits for UNIF or KGLI investors.

6. During the approximately 18 months I worked at KGLI as an executive, I met with several banks seeking to obtain short and long term financing for the company and its portfolio investments. During these meetings, I was informed that KGL was over-leveraged and that, from the banks' perspective, KGLI was under the KGL financial umbrella. Thus, banks refused granting both short term and long term debt to KGLI based on KGL's challenged balance sheet and inherent risk to the banks. Furthermore, I was informed in these conversations that Saeed Dashti himself and other KGL and KGL Holding executives, frequently attempted to secure additional debt financing for KGLI through these banks, but would be denied based on the poor financial condition of KGL.

7. When I was employed at KGLI, I reviewed KGLI's internal financial statements and observed that KGLI consistently had a negative cash flow, and was not generating profits for its investors. I also saw financial statements that had been provided to investors. The financial statements provided to investors consistently, and in bad faith, misrepresented financial data regarding KGLI and its portfolio companies' actual financial condition. With regards to misleading financial information communicated to investors, by way of example, the Port Fund's quarterly reports, in breach of KGLI's (the General Partner and Management Advisor) fiduciary duty to its Limited Partners, consistently failed to communicate accurately
the poor financial condition of the Fund and its investments to its Limited Partners. (One of the Limited Partner of this Fund was the Public Institution for Social Security ("PIFSS") for the State of Kuwait.)

8. In addition, KGLI never disclosed to investors the fact that certain portfolio investments, including UNIF and a company called Pro Gas, were losing money, and in the case of Pro Gas, was on the verge of bankruptcy, having received bankruptcy notices from Pakistani banks and court. Moreover, KGLI failed to advise investors that Hyde Park, a KGLI investment in Georgia, USA, was losing money in 2008. Further, KGLI's "independent" auditors were in reality controlled by Ms. Lazareva, who authorized such false and misleading financials be communicated to investors.

9. Further, when KGLI sold 49% of its investment in KGL Petroleum to PIFSS, KGLI intentionally misrepresented KGL Petroleum's investment portfolio valuation and financials at approximately 30% (by, among other things, falsely inflating its cash flow), when, in fact, KGL Petroleum had zero or negative returns. By intentionally misrepresenting the valuation of KGL Petroleum, KGLI increased the management fee it received from the KGL Petroleum, which was 2% of the stated asset value.

10. I understood that Ms. Lazareva and Saeed Dashti took a number of trips on private planes to, among other places, Iran, Syria, and Russia. Following each trip, I observed in KGLI's internal financial statements an influx of funds into KGLI's accounts. Ms. Lazareva told me and others at KGLI that these trips were for "fundraising;" however, to my knowledge, such fundraising was not tied to any formalized investment process. Further, the timing of Ms. Lazareva and Saeed Dashti's trips typically occurred at times when KGLI needed money, of which I was aware based on my concurrent review of KGLI's financial statements.
11. In 2008, I was asked by Ms. Lazareva to go to Syria to review a potential investment by KGLI in a port in Syria. This investment did not make sense to me because KGLI had created the Port Fund, specifically to invest in port investment opportunities. There was no reason for KGLI to invest directly in a Syrian port. I was asked by Ms. Lazareva to use my Egyptian passport during the trip. As a US citizen, I refused to go to Syria, specifically because Syria was on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals List. As a result of my refusal, I was treated differently by KGLI management, with the exception of my direct supervisor, Mr. Salam, who supported my decision not to go on this trip. I understood that Mr. Salam was asked to travel to Syria and Sudan by Ms. Lazareva and similarly refused to travel to those countries.

12. Ms. Lazareva described to me the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines ("IRISL") as KGLI's vehicle to Iran and she further told me that IRISL made a lot of money for KGLI. When I was employed at KGLI, I observed Ms. Lazareva in her office reviewing documents related to IRISL, which bore the logo of IRISL, as well as the Iranian emblem.

13. Towards the end of my tenure at KGLI, I was escorted to and locked in a room at KGLI for several hours with an in-house lawyer from KGL and an in-house lawyer from KGLI, without any food, or access to counsel, telephone or any translation or review process. I could not understand why a KGLI lawyer would be present, as I did not work for KGL; and no plausible explanation for his presence was provided to me. I was told to sit down at a table, which had several pieces of paper on it. I observed that the papers were print outs of my emails, both from my KGLI account, as well as my personal Yahoo.com account. I had never provided anyone at KGLI or KGL with the password to my Yahoo.com account, so I determined that someone at KGL or KGLI had accessed my account without my permission and had printed out...
the emails in front of me. I came to understand from the lawyers that KGLI wanted to fire Mr. Salam because they believed he was seeking to make an investment outside of KGLI. The lawyers presented me with a document and told me to sign it. They indicated that the document was a statement by me that supported the company’s allegations against Mr. Salam, and which the company would use in connection with his termination. I also understood that the statement included an admission that I had helped Mr. Salam with his outside investment, and I had knowledge of Mr. Salem’s alleged misconduct, and could be linked to this activity in the future if KGLI ultimately terminated me. I could not read the document because it was in Arabic and I cannot read that language. I clearly stated this fact to the lawyers. I asked for a translation of the statement; but was refused. Further, based on the questioning and statements by the lawyers, I knew that the allegations contained in the statement were false. I refused to sign the document initially; however, the lawyers persisted in telling me that I had to sign the document in order to leave the room. I was intimidated and felt very threatened, and I ultimately signed the document under duress for fear of physical harm for myself and my family, as well as the threat of criminal prosecution in Kuwait. I asked for a copy of the statement, but the lawyers refused to give it to me. After this event, I was completely shunned by KGLI management and a month or two later I left KGLI and moved my family out of Kuwait because I feared for both my safety and my family’s had we stayed in Kuwait.

14. I declare subject to the penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904 that the facts set forth above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed on February 5, 2013 in New York, New York.

By: Ahmed Mahrnik